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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY--CONTACT OBLIGATIONS CAN BE EN-
FORCED AGAINST THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA IN AN ORDINARY
ACTION AT LAW. State Board of Public Affairs v. Principal Fund-
ing Corp., 542 P.2d 503 (Okla. 1975).
In State Board of Public Affairs v. Principal Funding Corp.,' the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that when
a person or entity enters into a valid contract with the proper
State officials and a valid appropriation has been made there-
for, the State has consented to being sued and waived its gov-
ernmental immunity to the extent of its contractual obliga-
tions and such contractual obligations may be enforced against
the State in an ordinary action at law.2
In so holding, the supreme court took a step, albeit small, towards
abrogating the state's sovereign immunity from suit on its contracts.3
Principal Funding had entered into a written rental agreement with
the State Board of Public Affairs.4 The state refused to pay some of the
rental installments due under the agreement because it believed the lease
to be terminated. Principal Funding then brought an action at law
against the state to recover the rental payments allegedly due. The state
demurred on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over it in
1. 542 P.2d 503 (Okla. 1975). This case was first considered by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court in State ex rel. State Bd. of Pub. Affairs v. Principal Funding Corp.,
519 P.2d 503 (Okla. 1974).
2. 542 P.2d at 506. This holding modified State ex rel. Department of Highways
v. McKnight, 496 P.2d 775 (Okla. 1972), and cases of similar import cited note 7 infra.
State ex rel. State Bd. of Pub. Affairs v. Principal Funding Corp., 519 P.2d 503 (Okla.
1974), was overruled.
3. In Schrom v. Oklahoma Indus. Dev., 536 P.2d 904 (Okla. 1975), the supreme
court carved out an exception to sovereign immunity in tort actions. There it was held
that a department of the state which has purchased liability insurance has waived its
immunity to the extent of the insurance coverage and thus given its consent to be sued.
4. The State Board of Public Affairs is responsible for making "all necessary con-
tracts by or on behalf of the State for any buildings or rooms rented for the use of the
State .... " OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 63 (1971).
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such an action in the absence of its express consent to suit. The trial
court overruled the demurrer. On appeal, the supreme court held that
an ordinary action at law could not be maintained against the state
without its express consent. However, it also noted that when the state
has properly entered into a contract for which a valid appropriation has
been made and then refuses to pay its legal contractual obligations after
the other party to the contract has fully performed, that an action in
mandamus would lie to compel the state's payment of the obligation.
Upon remand, Principal Funding proceeded in mandamus and was
granted the requested relief. The state appealed and the supreme court
handed down the decision under consideration here.
As exemplified by the holding of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in
its first consideration of the Principal Funding case,6 the rule in Okla-
homa has been, prior to the holding in the second Principal Funding
decision, that the state in its sovereign capacity cannot be sued without
its express consent.7  This rule became part of the common law in
Oklahoma as in many states. In some states this principle has become
law through constitutional provision.8 The rationale for the sovereign's
immunity from suit' has ancient origins. It was alluded to in the
seventeenth century by Thomas Hobbes.
5. State ex reL State Bd. of Pub. Affairs v. Principal Funding Corp., 519 P.2d 503,
505 (Okla. 1974).
6. Id.
7. See Henry v. Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 478 P.2d 898 (Okla. 1970), citing State
ex rel. Department of Highways v. Keen, 354 P.2d 399 (Okla. 1960); State ex rel. Wil-
liamson v. Superior Court, 323 P.2d 979 (Okla. 1958); Duncan v. State Highway
Comm'n, 311 P.2d 203 (Okla. 1957); State ex rel. Commissioners of Land Office v.
Duggins, 258 P.2d 891 (Okla. 1955); Mountcastle v. State, 193 Okla. 506, 145 P.2d 392
(1944); Donaldson v. Board of Regents, 190 Okla. 269, 122 P.2d 139 (1942); Patterson
v. City of Checotah, 187 Okla. 587, 103 P.2d 97 (1940); Jack v. State, 183 Okla. 375,
82 P.2d 1033 (1937); State Highway Comm'n v. Adams, 178 Okla. 270, 62 P.2d 1013
(1937); State Highway Comm'n v. Brixey, 178 Okla. 118, 61 P.2d 1114 (1936); Hawks
v. Walsh, 177 Okla. 564, 61 P.2d 1109 (1936); Antrim Lumber Co. v. Sneed, 175 Okla.
47, 52 P.2d 1040 (1936); Wentz v. Potter, 167 Okla. 154, 28 P.2d 562 (1934); State
ex rel. Commissioners of Land Office v. Board of Comm'rs, 166 Okla. 78, 25 P.2d 1074
(1933); Hawks v. Bland, 156 Okla. 48, 9 P.2d 720 (1932); National Sur. Co. v. State
Banking Bd., 49 Okla. 184, 152 P. 389 (1915); Love v. Filtsch, 33 Okla. 131, 124 P.
30 (1912); James v. Trustees of Wellston Township, 18 Okla. 56, 90 P. 100 (1907).
8. See ALAS. CONST. art II, § 21; A m CONST. art. 4, § 18; CAL. CONsT. art. 3,
§ 5; CONN. CONsT. art. 11, § 4; DEL CONST. art. 1, § 9; FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 13;
IND. CONST. art. 4, § 24; Ky. CONST. § 231; LA. CONST. art. 3, § 35, art. 19, § 26; Micm.
CONST. art. 9, § 22; NEV. CONST. art. V, § 22; N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 18(b), art. 6,
§ 9; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 22; Omo CONST. art. I, § 16; ORE. CONsT. art. IV, § 24;
PA. CONsr. art. 1, § 11; S.C. CONsr. art. 17, § 2; S.D. CONST. art. I1, § 27; TENN.
CONST. art. 1. § 17; WASH. CONST. art. 2, § 26; Wis. CONST. art. 4, § 27; WYo. CONST.
art. 1, § 8.
9. The state's immunity from suit must be distinguished from its immunity from
liability. Immunity from suit developed frQm the premise that the king is sovereign.
[Vol. 11
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The Sovereign of a Common-wealth, be it an Assembly, or
one Man, is not Subject to the Civil Lawes. For having power
to make, and repeale Lawes, he may when he pleaseth, free
himselfe from that subjection, by repealing those Lawes that
trouble him, and making of new; and consequently he was
free before. For he is free, that can be free when he will:
Nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himselfe; be-
cause he that can bind, can release; and therefore he that is
bound to himselfe onely, is not bound.1"
Justice Holmes explained the rationale when he said: "A sovereign is
exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or absolute
theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends."'"
The holding in the second Principal Funding decision represents a
logical modification of a line of cases developing from dicta in one of
the first Oklahoma cases upholding the state's immunity from suit on its
contracts.' 2 Love v. Filtsch'8 was an action in mandamus to compel the
payment of rent by the state growing out of its contract with a private
individual. The claim was denied on the ground that the state could not
be sued without its express consent. However, in disallowing the claim,
the court also seemed to be influenced by the fact that the legislature
had made no appropriation of funds for the contract and that the
amount of the claim was disputed.1 4 Two interlocking principles can
be drawn from the cases that have developed from this dicta in Love. If,
on the one hand, no definite fund has been set aside by the state
specifically for the payment of its obligation under a contract, a judg-
See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, ComrNTAR~ms *243; 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUS-
TOMS OF ENGLAND 33 (Thorne ed. 1968). Immunity from liability developed from the
familiar premise that the "king can do no wrong," that the king is possessed with ab-
solute perfection in his political capacity. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *246.
In the contract area, sovereign immunity from suit is of primary concern.
10. T. HOBBS, LEviATHAN ch. 26, pt. 2, at 141 (1914).
11. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). See also Seaboard Air
Line R.R. v. Sarasota-Fruitville Drainage Dist., 255 F.2d 622 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 836 (1958); Crain v. Government of Guam, 195 F.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1952);
Bergner v. State, 144 Conn. 282, 130 A.2d 293 (Sup. Ct. Err. 1957); Bergner v. State,
20 Conn. Supp. 503, 141 A.2d 253 (Super. Ct. 1958); Cox v. Board of Comm'rs, 181
Md. 428, 31 A.2d 179 (1943); Dougherty v. Vidal, 37 N.M. 256, 21 P.2d 90 (1933);
State ex rel Department of Highways v. McKnight, 496 P.2d 775 (Okla. 1972); Griffis
v. State, 68 S.D. 360, 2 N.W.2d 666 (1942); Springvile Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah
2d 100, 349 P.2d 157, 167 (1960) (Henriod, J., commenting on concurring opinion of
Wade, J.).
12. Love v. Filtsch, 33 Okla. 131, 124 P. 30 (1912).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 135, 124 P. at 32.
1976]
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ment against it would operate directly to control the action of the state
and subject it to liability because the judgment would have to be paid
out of general state funds. Therefore, such a suit could not be main-
tained against the state without its express consent.'8 If, on the other
hand, the state has set aside a definite sum for the payment of a
contractual obligation in the form of an appropriation or other legisla-
tive enactment, an action in mandamus can be brought against the state
for the payment of the claim. 16 Mandamus will lie in such a situation
because the fact that there is a definite sum for payment of the claim
gives the plaintiff a clear legal right to the requested relief.17 This latter
principle was the basis for the cause of action suggested to the plaintiff
by the court in the first Principal Funding decision.' 8
The second Principal Funding decision retained the requirement of
an appropriation of some sort for maintenance of suit against the state.19
15. See, e.g., State Highway Comm'n v. Green-Boots Constr. Co., 199 Okla. 477,
187 P.2d 209 (1947); First Nat'l Bank v. Bradley, 186 Okla. 488, 98 P.2d 897 (1940);
Potter v. State Highway Comm'n, 184 Okla. 171, 86 P.2d 293 (1939); State Highway
Comm'n v. Brixey, 178 Okla. 118, 61 P.2d 1114 (1936); Hawks v. Walsh, 177 Okla.
564, 61 P.2d 1109 (1936); Antrim Lumber Co. v. Sneed, 175 Okla. 47, 52 P.2d 1040
(1935); Wentz v. Potter, 167 Okla. 154, 28 P.2d 562 (1934); National Sur. Co. v. State
Banking Bd., 49 Okla. 184, 152 P. 389 (1915); State Banking Bd. v. Oklahoma Banker's
Trust Co., 49 Okla. 72, 151 P. 566 (1915); Lankford v. Schroeder, 47 OCA. 279, 147
P. 1049 (1915); Lovett v. Lankford, 47 Okla. 12, 145 P. 767 (1915).
16. Such an action would be against the state auditor.
The State Auditor shall be the disbursing agency of the State and shall draw
either checks or warrants payable at the State Treasury, in payment of all
claims, including payrolls, against the State which shall be by law directed
to be paid out of the Treasury.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 62, § 41.18 (1971).
17. See, e.g., Fortinberry Co. v. Blundell, 206 Okla. 261, 242 P.2d 427 (1952); State
Highway Conm'n v. Green-Boots Constr. Co., 199 Okla. 477, 187 P.2d 209 (1947);
Carter v. Miley, 187 Okla. 530, 103 P.2d 933 (1940); State ex rel. Telle v. Carter, 170
Okla. 50, 39 P.2d 134 (1934); Edwards v. Carter, 167 Okla. 287, 29 P.2d 610 (1934);
Riley v. Carter, 165 Okla. 262, 25 P.2d 666 (1933). But cf. Marland v. Hoffman, 184
Okla. 391, 89 P.2d 287 (1939); Champlin v. Carter, 78 Okla. 300, 190 P. 679 (1920).
For a writ of mandamus to issue, Marland and Chanpln required a showing of a plain
legal duty on the part of the respondent not involving the exercise of discretion, and
lack of an adequate remedy at law for the plaintiff. These are also required by statute
in Oklahoma before a writ of mandamus can issue. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1451-52(1971). However, in comparing Marland and Charmpln with the cases cited at the be-
ginning of this note, it appears that these two requirements are not in issue when the
plaintiff can show a clear legal right to satisfaction of his claim by reason of the exist-
ence of a specific fund set aside therefor by a legislative appropriation or other legisla-
tive enactment.
18. State ex rel. State Bd. of Pub. Affairs v. Principal Funding Corp., 519 P.2d 503,
505 (Okla. 1974). Mandamus as a possible remedy against the state to compel payment
of a claim was also recognized by the court in State ex rel. Department of Highways
v. McKnight, 496 P.2d 775, 784 (Okla. 1972).
19. OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 55 provides in part: "No money shall ever be paid out
of the treasury of this State, nor any of its funds, nor any of the funds under its man-
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 11 [1975], Iss. 3, Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol11/iss3/11
1976] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
However, the requirement that the action be brought in the form of
mandamus has no been eliminated. The importance of the second
Principal Funding decision is that it allows an action at law to be
maintained against the state upon a contract without its express consent
so long as there has been an appropriation for the contract.
Oklahoma is not alone in its requirement of an appropriation
before a suit can be instituted against the state without its consent. 20
However, some states have judicially abrogated the doctrine of sovereign
immunity from suit on contracts under different theories where no such
requirement is made,21 and a few states have eliminated the doctrine
entirely through legislative enactment, establishing special courts of
claims to handle such actions against the state. 2  It is submitted that
Oklahoma should follow these latter states and rid itself of, as Justice
Traynor put it, this "anachronism without rational basis."2 3 Opponents
of the doctrine have reasoned that if a state is to gain the benefits of its
contracts, it should also shoulder the burdens. Eliminating this vestige
of government irresponsibility would seem to be especially urgent today
when the public's desire for government responsibility is so strong.
Nancy Nesbitt
agement, except in pursuance of an appropriation by law . ... " A case strictly con-
struing this section is Ling-Leeper Lumber Co. v. Carter, 161 Okla. 5, 17 P.2d 365
(1933). There are, however, situations where an appropriation per se is not required.
See, e.g., Fortinberry Co. v. Blundell, 206 Okla. 261, 242 P.2d 427 (1952); State ex rel.
Telle v. Carter, 170 Okla. 50, 39 P.2d 134 (1934); Edwards v. Carter, 167 Okla. 287,
29 P.2d 610 (1934); Riley v. Carter, 165 Okla. 262, 25 P.2d 666 (1933). Thus, the
Oklahoma courts may, under certain circumstances, interpret the appropriation require-
ment liberally.
20. The Indiana Supreme Court so held in Carr v. State, 127 Ind. 204, 26 N.E. 778
(1891). The "appropriation" rationale of this case has been followed by many courts
which have abrogated contract immunity, although some of these courts have modified
the rationale somewhat. See, e.g., Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Argric.,
136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957), aff'd on rehearing, 141 Colo. 467, 348 P.2d 962
(1960); George & Lynch, Inc. v. State, 197 A.2d 734 (Del. 1964); Regents of Univ.
Sys. v. Blanton, 49 Ga. 602, 176 S.E. 673 (Ga. App. 1934); Grant Constr. Co. v. Burns,
92 Idaho 408, 443 P.2d 1005 (1968); V.S. DiCarlo Constr. Co. v. State, 485 S.W.2d
(Mo. 1972); Muns v. State Bd. of Educ., 127 Mont 515, 267 P.2d 981 (1954).
21. For a thorough discussion of the different theories adopted by courts in their
abrogation of contract immunity see Comment, Sovereign Immunity in Contract Suits:
Victim of Judicial Abrogation in Iowa, 59 Iowa L. REv. 360, 365 (1973).
22. The most comprehensive of these are: N.Y. Or. CL. AcT §§ 1-30 (McKinney
1963), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1975-76); WASH. REv. Corm §§ 4.92.010-.170
(1962), as amended, (Supp. 1974), §§ 4.96.010-.020 (Supp. 1974).
23. Muskopf v. Coming Hospital Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 460, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89, 92 (1961).
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